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Peer Pressure in Work Teams :  
The effects of Inequity Aversion 
 
Pression des pairs dans les équipes de travail : 
Les effets de l’aversion à l’inégalité 
 
                David Masclet1 
      
 
Abstract:  
Many empirical studies have shed light on the efficiency of peer pressure. I propose here to model 
peer pressure by incorporating in the utility function self centered inequity aversion. I find that 
opportunity for sufficiently inequity averse players to punish their peers, is effective in inducing 
others to cooperate. At the equilibrium, all players cooperate and punish any shirker since 
punishing is a way to reduce inequity. Contrary, nobody cooperates without peer pressure even if 
players are inequity averse.  
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Résumé:  
Plusieurs études empiriques ont mis en évidence l’efficacité des mécanismes de pression des pairs. 
Je propose ici de modéliser la pression des pairs en incorporant l’aversion à l’inégalité dans la 
fonction d’utilité des agents. Je montre que lorsque les agents sont suffisamment averses à 
l’inégalité, ils sont incités à sanctionner leurs pairs et cela accroît la coopération au sein de 
l’équipe. A l’équilibre, tous les agents coopèrent et punissent tout comportement déviant puisque 
sanctionner un passager clandestin permet de réduire l’inégalité des gains. A l’inverse, lorsque les 
agents n’ont pas la possibilité de sanctionner leurs pairs, les agents ne peuvent pas soutenir la 
coopération mêmes s’ils sont averses à l’inégalité.  
 
 
Mots Clés : Pression des pairs, équipes de travail, Aversion à l’inégalité, bienveillance, 
coopération 
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1. Introduction 
Many empirical studies have shed light on the efficiency of peer pressure. Peer 
pressure can be defined as mechanisms of mutual monitoring and sanction established 
within a group of agents by the agents themselves in order to dissuade the members of the 
group to adopt a non-co-operative behavior. For example, authorities often post reward 
for citizens who report violations of crimes. Similarly, monitoring by peers in work 
teams, credit associations (Stiglitz, 1990; Varian, 1990), partnerships (Jones and Svejnar, 
1985 ; Rehder, 1990), is an effective means of attenuating incentives problems that arise 
when individual actions affecting the well being of others are not subject to enforceable 
contracts.  
Experimental studies also provided additional supports for the positive effect of 
peer pressure in inducing high levels of contribution to a public good. In their paper, Fehr 
and Gaechter (2000) consider how the level of contribution to a public good responds to 
the availability of an option for individual agents to punish other agents after they have 
observed their decisions. The results of Fehr and Gaechter are striking. In the only 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game it cannot be a best response to punish in 
the second game because such punishment is costly to the punisher. By backward 
induction, the best response in the first stage is to contribute zero to the group account. 
However, they observed a willingness to punish on the part of subjects. A possible 
explanation for such punishing behavior in one-shot conditions is that subjects would be 
willing to sanction for unfair behavior.  
In recent years experimental economists have gathered evidence that fairness 
cannot be ignored in social interactions (Guth, Schmittberger and Schwarze, 1982). One 
can distinguish two main approaches of fairness. The first approach relies on the 
importance of intentions of the other agents as a source of reciprocal behavior (Rabin, 
1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 1998). These models provide several interesting 
insights, but are not well suited for predictive purposes (Fehr and Schmidt, 2001). 
Moreover, the multiplicity of equilibria is a general feature of these models, which makes 
the equilibrium analysis fairly complex even in extremely simple sequential games. The 
second approach of fairness assumes that agents have social preferences ; i.e. the agents’ 
utility function does not only depend on their own material payoff but also on how much 
the other agents receive. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) develop a model in which a person 
exhibits inequity aversion if he dislikes being better and/or worse than others. At the 
same time, Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) propose a similar model of inequity aversion in 
which people compare their material payoff to the material average payoff of the group2. 
Even if models of social preferences are not fully satisfactory since they assume that 
agents are only concerned about the distributional consequences of their acts but not 
about the intentions, one can probably go a long way with such very simple models. 
The aim of this paper is to propose a model of peer pressure which incorporates 
fairness in the utility function. I consider a work team of two agents. In a first stage, the 
                                                 
2 The fundamental difference between Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) is the 
following : BO assumes that subjects like being as close as possible to the average payoff while FS 
assumes that subjects dislikes a payoff difference to any other individual. Engelmann and Strobel, (2000) 
designed a very simple experiment in order to compare the relative performance of the competing theories 
by BO and FS. Their results were clearly in favor of FS. 
agents decide to cooperate or to defect. In a second stage, they observe the decisions of 
their peers and can decide whether to punish them or not. Following Fehr and Schmidt, 
1999, I assume that people are motivated by self-centered inequity aversion. The agents’ 
utility depends not only on the payoffs of the original standard game but also on inequity 
aversion. An individual is inequity averse if he incurs disutility both from being worse off 
in material terms than the others (disadvantageous inequity) and from being better off 
(advantageous inequity). I show that the threat to punish defectors may be credible if 
players are sufficiently upset by inequality. Then it induces potential defectors to 
cooperate. 
This analysis builds on the work of Kandel and Lazear (1992) with the notable 
exception that I adopt here a sequential game-theoretic approach of peer pressure. Thus, 
Barron and Gjerde (1997) is much closer to this work in that they also adopt a sequential 
approach. However, their sequential game interpretation of peer pressure assuming that 
agents choose work effort taking as given the peer pressure environment, is not 
completely satisfactory.   
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I present a model 
of inequity aversion without peer pressure. I introduce peer pressure in section 3 and 
analyze the impact of inequity aversion on cooperation. Section 4 discusses the 
assumptions. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Model without peer pressure 
2.1. Assumptions and payoffs 
At the beginning of the game, players form a group to produce a good. If they 
Cooperate, more of the good is produced than if they defect. Defection may be thought of 
as shirking. Let n≥2 denote the number of members in the group and m, m≤n, the number 
of members who cooperate. All output is split equally among the members. The average 
output per member is denoted by f(m,n) and the cost to a single member of cooperating is 
denoted by X. When all members cooperate, each member receives a payoff of f(n,n)-X. 
If some members defect, the payoff to each defector is f(m,n) and the payoff to each 
cooperator is f(m,n)-X. When all defect, each member receives a payoff of zero. The 
payoff to each member i is therefore : 
( , )   if i cooperates
          if i defects   
0 0    if all players defect
i
f m n X
x f(m,n)
f( ,n)
−

= 

=
                                                                                
(i) 
I examine the equilibrium under the following key assumptions : 
(1) free riding problem. A defector gets a higher payoff than a cooperator. Defecting is a 
dominant strategy so that for any number of cooperators m>0, 
( , ) ( 1, ) f m n X f m n− < −                                                                                                      
(ii) 
I also require that  
( 1, 1) ( , )f m n f m n− − <                                                                                                         
(iii) 
,which is the mathematical statement that there exists aggregation economies : the 
presence of an additional cooperating member raises per capita output. Setting m=n, the 
above inequity implies that per capita payoffs are larger in a larger cooperating group. 
The output is normalized with zero cooperators to f(0,n)=0, which satisfies “No 
aggregation economies without cooperation”. As a complement to the above inequity, I 
assume that the presence of a defecting member does not raise the average output. 
Therefore, 
( , 1) ( , ) f m n f m n− =                                                                   
(iv) 
(2) Let us assume that ‘cooperation’ is socially valuable, so that the per capita payoff net 
of costs is higher if all cooperate than if all defect, 
( , ) 0f n n X− >                
(v) 
(3) Finally, following Fehr and Schmidt (1997), I also assume here that people are 
motivated by self-centered inequity aversion. The disutility from inequity is self-centered 
in the sense that player i compares himself to each of the other players but he does not 
care per se about inequalities within the group of his opponents. I transform here a 
standard game into an « inequity aversion game ». In this game the players ‘utility 
depends not only on the payoffs of the original standard game but also on inequity 
aversion. An individual is inequity averse if he incurs disutility both from being worse off 
in material terms than the others (disadvantageous inequity) and from being better off 
(advantageous inequity). I consider that the players are more sensitive to disadvantageous 
inequity which is given by the inequity aversion term αi, αi >0 than to advantageous 
inequity, given by βi with 0≤βi<1 such that αi >βi. The utility function of player 
i∈{1,…,n} is then given by :   
1 1( ) m ax( , 0 )- m ax( , 0 )  
1 1i i i j i i i jj i j i
U x x x x x x
n n
α β
≠ ≠
= − − −
− −
∑ ∑                       
(1) 
The first term of equation (1) represents the pecuniary payoff of player i. The second 
term in (1) measures the utility loss from disadvantageous inequity. The third term 
represents the utility loss from advantageous inequity. Furthermore, the assumption αi>βi 
captures the idea that a player suffers more from inequity that is to his disadvantage. For 
simplicity I assume that the utility function is linear in inequity aversion as well as in xi. 
This implies that the marginal rate of substitution between monetary income and inequity 
is constant.   
 2.2. Equilibrium 
In this section, I examine the symmetric Nash equilibrium in which all players 
choose the strategy of defection. Without opportunity of sanction, all players always 
defect is a Nash equilibrium. Indeed when the players have no opportunity to punish each 
other they are not able to support cooperation even if players are inequity averse. This 
follows from the fact that the only mean for an inequity averse player to reduce this 
inequity, is to reduce his own effort. 
Proposition 1 : without opportunity of sanction, there exist an equilibrium without 
cooperation and the output is not produced3.  
 
Proof : I prove that the strategy in which nobody cooperates supports an 
equilibrium. To do so, I must show that no subject has an incentive to deviate from this 
proposed equilibrium. Let us consider the utility function of player i when all other 
players defect. The payoff of each subject i can be written as: 
( 0) : (0, ) 0iU X f n= =                                               
(2) 
Suppose that player i deviates from the equilibrium and chooses to cooperate. Then his 
payoff is given by : 
( 0) : (1, ) ( 1)   
1
i
iU X f n X n Xn
α
> − − −
−
          
(3) 
The first term of the utility function of player i represents the average output per member 
player i receives when all the other subjects defect while he cooperates. The second term 
represents the cost for player i of cooperating. finaly, the third term represents the 
                                                 
3 The formal proof for the uniqueness of the equilibrium without cooperation under weak 
conditions of inequity is relegated to appendix A.  
disadvantageous inequity the player i experiences relative to the (n-1) other players who 
fully defect. Indeed, the net gain from defecting is X. 
Let us consider the incentive for player i to deviate. Player i is incited to cooperate 
if and only if the following condition is verified: 
{ } { }( 0) ( 0) 0 : (1, ) (0, ) 0 
                                             (1, ) (0, ) 0
i i i
i
U X U X f n X X f n
f n X f n X
α
α
> − = > ⇔ − − − >
⇔ − − − >
      
(4) 
From assumption (ii), one knows that : ),1(),( nmfXnmf −<− . Thus it appears that 
f(1,n)-X<f(0,n). Moreover, when subject i cooperates while all the other subjects defect, 
he experiences disadvantageous inequity relative to all the (n-1) other players. Since, 
αi>0, then the above condition is never verified. Therefore, nobody is incited to deviate 
from the equilibrium. Thus cooperation cannot emerge in a team without peer pressure. 
Indeed, players are not incited to cooperate since they incur disadvantageous inequity 
relative to the other players who fully defect. The theoretical predictions remain the same 
as in case without aversion to inequity.  
3. Model with peer pressure 
Consider now a slightly different game in which the players have the opportunity to 
punish their peers. Can cooperation emerge when inequity averse players have the 
opportunity to sanction their peers? 
 
 
3.1. Assumptions and payoffs  
In a first stage, the players decide to cooperate or to defect. In a second stage, they 
observe the decisions of their peers and can decide whether to punish them or not. When 
a player is punished by someone, he receives a sanction Y. A player who punishes his 
peer also incurs a cost for doing that given by cY with 0<c≤1.  
(4) In addition to the general assumptions, I must restrict the magnitude of the 
parameters. Let us assume that :  
i  X  Y >                 
(vi) 
so that the sanction must be high enough such that deviators cannot get a higher payoff 
than the enforcers. The penalty is larger than the benefit from cheating against 
cooperators. 
3.2. Equilibrium 
In this section I examine a symmetric perfect equilibrium in which each player 
adopts a strategy called “cooperation enforcement”. A player following strategy of 
“cooperation enforcement” cooperates along the equilibrium path and punishes anyone 
who deviates from this strategy unless he has violated the strategy of cooperation 
enforcement in the preceding phase, in which case he does not punish4. On the 
equilibrium path, everyone cooperates; if anyone deviates by defecting, the others still 
cooperate but punish him. I prove that “cooperation enforcement” supports an 
equilibrium with cooperation. Indeed, contrary to the case without any opportunity of 
punishment, there is now another means to reduce disadvantageous disutility : players 
can interfere on the payoff of the others players by sanctioning them. 
Proposition 2 : The opportunity to reduce the payoffs of the other members increases 
cooperation if players are sufficiently upset by inequity.  
 
Proof : Proposition 2 show that cooperation can be sustained as an equilibrium. I 
use backward induction to verify that the strategy combination in which all players 
cooperate to produce the output in first stage and punish any defector in second stage is a 
subgame perfect equilibrium. 
 
(1) In the second stage, the players decide to punish or not the other members of their 
group. Let n≥2 denote the number of members in the group and m, the number of 
members who cooperate. I have to check that the threat of punishment is credible. To do 
that, I must show that a subject is not incited to deviate from the subgame equilibrium in 
which subjects punish any defector. Let us consider the utility of a potential enforcer who 
does punish shirkers while all other enforcers punish shirkers such as : 
{ }( 0) : ( , ) ( ) ( )( ( ) )  
1
i
iU P f m n X cY n m n m X cY n m mYn
α
> − − − − − + − −
−
      
(5) 
The first term of the utility function of player i represents the average output per member 
player i receives. The second term represents the cost for player i of cooperating. The 
third term represents the disadvantageous inequity the player i experiences relative to the 
(n-m) players who fully defect. The sanction Y each enforcer imposes on each shirker 
reduces the disadvantageous inequity from Y. However, subject i incurs a cost cY when 
he sanctions a shirker, which increases the disadvantageous inequity. At least, the last 
term represents the cost of punishing the (n-m) shirkers.  
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Let us consider now the utility of player i if he chooses not to punish a shirker such as : 
( 0) : ( , ) ( )( ( 1) ) ( 1)( )   
1 1
i i
iU P f m n X n m X m Y m n m cYn n
α β
= − − − − − − − −
− −
              
(6) 
If player i chooses not to punish the other members of his group, he saves the cost cY(n-
m) but experiences now more disadvantageous inequity relative to the defectors and also 
advantageous inequity relative to the (m-1) other enforcers who fully punish the (n-m) 
defectors. The latter generates a utility loss of [β(m-1)(n-m))cY]/(n-1) whereas the former 
reduces utility by [α(n-m)Y(1-c(n-m))]/(n-1).  
Thus a player chooses to punish the defectors if and only if the following condition is 
verified: 
[ ]1 (1 ( )) ( 1)
1 i i
c n m m c c
n
α β− − + − >
−
                      
(7) 
Some simple algebraic manipulations show that the above condition is equivalent to the 
following : 
g(c,m,n,α,β)=αI(1-c(n-m))+ βI(m-1)c-c(n-1)>0                                
(8) 
The following table resumes the expected effects of the different parameters of the 
equation (8) (Appendix B). 
Table 1 : parameters 
 n c α β 
g(.) - - + + 
 
 
Thus if players are sufficiently averse to disadvantageous inequity but also to 
advantageous inequity and if the cost of punishing a shirker is sufficiently low, then 
players will punish all defectors.  
 
(2) Suppose that the condition (7) is satisfied. In first stage of the game, the players 
decide to cooperate or not. Consider now the incentives of a player to deviate in first 
stage. Let us consider first the utility of a player who follows the equilibrium path, i.e. 
that he cooperates while all the other players cooperate. Then his payoff is given by : 
( 0) : ( , )iU X f n n X> −             
(9) 
If player i deviates from the equilibrium and defect at this stage, his payoff becomes: 
( 0) : ( -1, ) ( -1) - ( -1)
-1
i
iU X f n n n X n Yn
β
= −                        
(10) 
Then i’s immediate payoff from defecting is the receipt of f(n-1,n) instead of f(n,n)-X. 
But if he defects, he will be punished in second stage, which yields him a loss of (n-1)Y.  
Therefore the condition for player i to prefer cooperate is : 
1 ( 1)  if(n ,n) X - n Y  f(n,n)- Xβ− − − <         
(11) 
Assumptions (iii) and (iv) together imply that f(m-1,n)<f(m,n) (per capita is raised by 
adding a cooperator) and (vi) X<(n-1)Y, so condition (11) is always satisfied. Hence the 
players are not going to deviate at stage 1. Then, in the first stage each player cooperates. 
In the second stage, there is no punishment since each player cooperates in first stage. If 
one cooperators deviates and defects, then each enforcer punishes the defector. 
Comparing the cases with and without opportunity of punishment, it is easy to see that 
cooperation is greatly improved if there is an opportunity to punish defectors.  
There is another symmetric perfect subgame equilibrium in this sequential game in 
which nobody cooperates at first stage and nobody punishes at second stage since it 
provides the same material payoff for each players and does not generate inequity. Which 
equilibrium will be chosen? Let us note E1, the equilibrium with cooperation and E2 the 
equilibrium without cooperation. E1 Pareto dominates E2. In a single shot interaction, it 
is difficult to say which equilibrium will be chosen. However, if one applies Pareto 
dominance without perfection, E1 will be the equilibrium since both players prefer it 
(Rasmusen, 1994).  
Suppose now that this game is played twice with the first game outcome observed 
before the second game begins. A possible refinement consists in using the Pareto 
dominated equilibrium as a threat in case of non co-operation. Suppose further that the 
players anticipate that the second game outcome will be as follows : E1 if the first game 
outcome is E1; E2 if the first outcome game is E2 (Gibbons, 1992, pp82-88). Then E1 is 
a subgame perfect equilibrium for both games of this super game. Since only Nash 
equilibrium are discussed, the players’ agreements are self enforcing which is a more 
limited suggestion than the approach in cooperative game theory according to which the 
players make binding agreements5. 
                                                 
5 A generalized proof of this result, which can also apply to the repeated plays, is given in van 
Damme, (1991, pp. 198-206), in Gibbons, (1992, pp. 82-88) and in Eichberger (1993, pp. 224-229).  
Thus under some conditions, cooperation can be sustained as an equilibrium 
outcome with peer pressure if the players are sufficiently sensitive to disadvantageous 
inequity such that they are willing to reduce it by punishing the other players. Indeed, 
although it can be costly to punish the other players, subjects can gain some utility by 
punishing free riders since it is a way to repair a form of injustice.  
4. Relaxing assumptions  
4.1. Particular case : c=1 
This section focuses on the case in which c=1, i.e. the cost of punishment is equal to the 
sanction. I assumed in the previous section, that a punisher incurred a cost given by cY , 
0<c≤1. I prove that in the case when c=1, players are not incited to punish their peers and 
that defection is a dominant strategy in the first stage of the game.  
Proposition 3 : when the cost of punishment is equal to the sanction (i.e. c=1),  then 
cooperation cannot emerge. 
Proof : 
If c=1, then condition (7) becomes : 
[ ]
( 0) ( 0) 0
1 ( 1) ( 1) 1 
1
i i
i i
U Y U Y
m n m
n
β α
> − = >
⇔ − − − − >
−
       
(12) 
This condition is never verified. Players are not incited to punish since punishment 
cannot reduce disadvantageous inequity relative to the shirkers. The difference of 
monetary payoffs between each enforcer and the shirkers remains the same. By backward 
induction, in first stage of the game, the dominant strategy for each player is to defect.  
4.2. Magnitude of sanctions 
Let us consider now the particular case in which the penalty Y is independent of the 
number of punishers6. Ostracism can be an example of such sanction since the penalty 
from being ostracized by one’s peers is independent of the number of excluders. In this 
case the condition given by equation (7) becomes : 
  [ ]
( 0) ( 0) 0
( 1) ( 1) ( ) 0  
i i
i i
U Y U Y
m n n mβ α
> − = >
⇔ − − − − − >
     
 (13) It is easy to observe that the above condition is never verified. Indeed, if 
all other players punish, player i is incited to deviate by not punishing since sanctions are 
independent from the number of punishers. Players anticipate that there will be no 
punishment in the second stage of the game and all players defect in first stage.  
                                                 
6 James S. Coleman (1990) distinguishes incremental sanctioning, in which cost incurred by each 
sanctioner is small and the effect is also small but the effects are additive and heroic sanctioning, in which 
the total effect of a sanction occurs through a single actor’s action (for example, to bell the cat in the 
Aesop’s fable “The mice in council”). The overall difference between these two sanctions lies in the 
magnitude of the costs incurred by the sanctioners at every stage. 
5. Discussion 
A comparison of models with and without peer pressure reveals that the availability 
of punishment supports cooperation. Indeed, if subjects are sufficiently upset by inequity, 
they are willing to punish the defectors even though this is costly to themselves. One can 
compare this reaction to the satisfaction for a victim to punish his aggressor (Lindbeck 
1997). In the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game, it is a best response to 
punish defectors in the second stage. By backward induction, the best response in the first 
stage is to cooperate since threat of punishment is credible.   
This analysis also reveals the limits of peer pressure. Indeed, if the cost of 
punishment is equal to the sanction, then punishment is not a credible threat since it 
cannot reduce inequity. Moreover, the efficiency of peer pressure also depends on the 
magnitude of sanctions. If sanctions are independent of the number of punishers such that 
a defector receives the same sanction whatever be the number of punishers, then peer 
pressure is ineffective.  
While this analysis of peer pressure is illustrative, a number of topics for future 
research remain. A direction for future research would be to consider the influence of non 
monetary sanctions. Non monetary sanctions are key to the enforcement of implicit 
agreements and social norms. Kandel and Lazear (1992) explored how non monetary 
sanctions (disapproval) operates. Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher (2000) examined the 
determinants of such informal sanctions by a large number of experiments. Since 
informal sanctions cannot reduce the payoff differences, inequity aversion cannot explain 
the efficiency of such peer pressure. This would mean that sanctions would not only be 
driven by the willingness to reduce payoff differences.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A: non cooperation without sanction 
In order to verify that the equilibrium where nobody cooperates is the unique 
equilibrium under weak conditions, let us consider another proposed equilibrium where 
all subjects cooperate to produce the good. To verify that the strategy consisting in 
cooperating supports a Nash equilibrium, I must show that no player is incited to deviate 
from this proposed equilibrium. Let us consider the utility function of player i when all 
players cooperate. The payoff of each subject i can be written as: 
( 0) : ( , )iU X f n n X> −                                              
(A1) If a player i deviates from the equilibrium and does not cooperate, then his payoff is 
given by:  
( 0) : ( 1, ) ( 1)   
1
i
iU X f n n n Xn
β
= − − −
−
         
(A2) 
When player i deviates from the equilibrium, he saves the cost X for cooperating but 
experiences now advantageous inequity aversion relative to the n-1 other subjects who 
cooperate. Player i is incited to deviate from the proposed equilibrium if the following 
condition is verified : 
( , ) ( 1, )1i
f n n f n n
X
β − −< −             
(A3) 
Thus if players obey the condition ( , ) ( 1, )1i
f n n f n n
X
β − −< − , then there is an unique 
equilibrium with no cooperation. 
 
Appendix B 
(1) (1-c(n-m)) 0                                     ;                 (4) ( 1) 0
(2) ( 1) 0                                          ;                (5) 0
(3) ( 1) (
i
i
i
i
dg dg c
d dn
dg dgm c c
d dm
dg m
dc
α
α
ββ
β
= > = − − <
= − > = >
= − − 1) ( ) 0in n mα− − − <
 
 
 
